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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1970s, the National Parks and Conservation Association 
(Association), an independent organization focused on advocacy related to 
the National Parks System, sought records under the Freedom of 
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Information Act (FOIA)2 pertaining to concession operations run at 
National Parks around the United States.3 The Association had asked the 
Director of the National Park Service to disclose specified documents 
pertaining to these operations.4 Although the Park Service provided some 
documents obtained “without extensive research,” it refused to provide the 
“results of audits upon the books of several companies operating 
concessions in the national parks, the annual financial statements filed with 
the Park Service by these concessioners, and other financial information.”5  
The Park Service cited Exemption 4 of FOIA,6 which protects “trade 
secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person 
[that are] privileged or confidential.”7 The National Parks and Conservation 
Association ultimately filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia,8 which held that the “sales statistics, inventories, 
holdings, expenses, statements of profits and gross receipts, securities, 
liabilities, and salaries and bonuses by position” contained within the 
requested materials constituted “confidential” information under 
Exemption 4.9 However, the case would take on significant importance 
when, in 1974, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit created a two-
part test requiring that, in order to withhold records, the agency must show 
disclosure of the requested information would either impair the federal 
government’s ability to obtain related information in the future or cause 
“substantial harm” to the “competitive position” of the individual or 
organization from whom the materials were obtained.10  
Significantly, this test would be used in FOIA Exemption 4 cases for 
the next several decades but would be rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court 
on June 24, 2019, when the majority held that such a showing of harm was 
not necessary under the statutory language of the exemption.11 The Court 
held that Exemption 4 allows a federal agency to withhold “confidential” 
financial information when it is “customarily and actually” treated as private 
by the owner of the information and is provided to the government under 
an assurance of privacy.12 Observers criticized the ruling for several reasons, 
                                                           
2 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018). 
3 Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 351 F. Supp. 404, 405 (D.D.C. 1972). 
4 Id.  
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 405–06. 
7 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2018); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 
ACT GUIDE: EXEMPTION 4 (2004), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-guide-2004-edition-
exemption-4 [https://perma.cc/DWM8-YDUV]. This article uses the 2004 edition as it 
provides an extensive discussion of judicial action related to Exemption 4. 
8 Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n, 351 F. Supp. at 404. 
9 Id. at 406, 407.  
10 Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
11 Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2366 (2019). 
12 Id. 
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including that expanding the scope of information protected from 
disclosure by Exemption 4 would limit newsgathering, government 
transparency, and the free flow of information.13 Others argued that the 
ruling could potentially conflict with the “foreseeable harm standard,” which 
states that a federal agency can withhold information only if it “reasonably 
foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by [a FOIA] 
exemption.”14 
This article joins other observers in arguing that this holding by the 
Supreme Court was problematic in several ways, necessitating action by 
Congress to clarify the meaning of “confidential” in Exemption 4. More 
specifically, this article argues that Congress can, and should, ensure that 
Exemption 4 does not prohibit the disclosure of information of public 
concern, absent a showing of at least some harm, as Justice Stephen Breyer 
argued in his dissenting opinion.15 By limiting the scope of Exemption 4, 
Congress would promote government openness and transparency. Such an 
action would also ensure that the news media and others can obtain 
information of public interest necessary to hold government agencies 
accountable, including in their connections to private businesses.  
This article first reviews the legislative history of Exemption 4. It argues 
that the question of whether Exemption 4 requires a showing of harm was 
not resolved explicitly either way by Congress. Second, this article discusses 
key federal court cases that have dealt with Exemption 4, including National 
Parks, demonstrating that the two-part test articulated by the D.C. Circuit 
has been adopted by most federal circuits in the decades since that ruling. 
Third, this article discusses the Supreme Court’s ruling in Food Marketing 
Institute v. Argus Leader Media, including the arguments made by both 
sides in their briefs before the Court, as well as the facts and opinions in the 
case. Fourth, this article joins other commentators in arguing for 
Congressional action following Food Marketing Institute. Specifically, it 
seeks clarification of whether harm is required under Exemption 4 to ensure 
                                                           
13 See James Bovard, The Supreme Court Rewrote FOIA into the Freedom FROM 
Information Act, USA TODAY (June 27, 2019), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/06/27/loss-foia-scotus-government-keep-
food-stamp-data-secret-column/1559162001 [https://perma.cc/7NH6-C3FT]; Mark 
Fenster, Opinion Analysis: Court Gives Broad Meaning to “Confidential” in FOIA 
Exemption for Commercial and Financial Information, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2019, 7:48 
PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/opinion-analysis-court-gives-broad-meaning-to-
confidential-in-foia-exemption-for-commercial-and-financial-information 
[https://perma.cc/JUE3-BHE3]; Jessica Gresko, Justices Side with Business, Government in 
Information Fight, AP NEWS (June 24, 2019), 
https://apnews.com/44d921a0323448fbaa4372c150eb655e [https://perma.cc/H3K8-
T26G]. 
14 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A) (2018). More information and commentary on the “foreseeable 
harm standard” is provided at infra notes 117–23. 
15 See Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2368 (2019) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
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the free flow of information in cases like Food Marketing Institute, where 
the requested records contain only proprietary or secret commercial 
information but also raise significant matters of public concern. Finally, this 
article highlights a piece of legislation introduced in the U.S. Senate in June 
2019,16 demonstrating that Congressional action is not only needed, but 
possible. 
II. HISTORY 
The following sections will provide key background information, 
including a brief history of FOIA, the legislative history of Exemption 4, and 
a discussion of key circuit court rulings that address this exemption, 
particularly related to whether it requires a showing of harm to prevent 
disclosure of requested materials. 
A. Brief History of FOIA 
FOIA was signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1966 
and took effect on July 4, 1967, with the intention of creating a presumption 
of public access to the records of any federal agency.17 Under the statute, 
agencies are generally required to disclose records unless they fall under 
one of nine exemptions, including Exemption 4.18  
FOIA has undergone several amendments, including most recently in 
2016 when President Barack Obama signed the FOIA Improvement Act of 
2016.19 This amendment promoted greater public access to government 
records that were frequently requested, and created a single online portal 
for FOIA requests, among other provisions.20 The most lauded change, 
which had been proposed by previous administrations, including that of 
                                                           
16 Open and Responsive Government Act of 2019, S. 2220, 116th Cong. (2019), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/2220/text [https://perma.cc/P49C-
EQHS]. 
17 See generally History of FOIA, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/issues/transparency/history-of-foia [https://perma.cc/TSE7-SUSF] (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2019); Joan M. Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under 
the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TEX. L. REV. 1261, 1261–84 (1969); SUZANNE J. 
PIOTROWSKI, GOVERNMENTAL TRANSPARENCY IN THE PATH OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
REFORM (2007) (discussing the implementation of FOIA); MICHAEL R. LEMOV, PEOPLE’S 
WARRIOR: JOHN MOSS AND THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND CONSUMER 
RIGHTS (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2011) (discussing Congressman John Moss’s 
efforts to pass FOIA). 
18 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2018). 
19 FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-85, 130 Stat. 538. 
20 Scott Memmel, President Obama Signs Law Making Significant Amendments to the 
Freedom of Information Act, 21 SILHA BULLETIN 10 (Summer 2016), 
http://silha.umn.edu/assets/pdf/2016-summer-bulletin.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A4D-PLVK].  
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President Bill Clinton,21 was the explicit requirement that federal agencies 
must consider releasing records under a “presumption of openness” 
standard, rather than presuming government information is secret.22 The 
standard therefore “place[d] the burden on agencies to justify withholding 
information, instead of on the requester to justify release.”23 Under this 
standard, agencies may withhold requested records only when “foreseeable 
harm” could be caused by the release.24 
One reason for the passage of the amendment was a memorandum 
issued in October 2001 by then-Attorney General John Ashcroft in the wake 
of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.25 Among other provisions, the 
memorandum for the “heads of all federal departments and agencies” 
ordered the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to defend all decisions to 
withhold records, “unless they lack a sound legal basis or present an 
unwarranted risk of adverse impact on the ability of other agencies to protect 
other important records.”26 The memorandum also stated that “[a]ny 
discretionary decision by [a federal agency] to disclose information 
protected under FOIA should be made only after full and deliberate 
consideration of the institutional, commercial, and personal privacy 
interests that could be implicated by disclosure of the information.”27  
B. Legislative History 
Congress’ motivations behind FOIA Exemption 4—in particular, what 
kinds of information Congress intended to protect—are not easily 
discernible. Although one court has characterized FOIA’s legislative history 
as “tortured, not to say obfuscating,”28 certain benchmarks and objectives of 
the bill are relatively clear. 
                                                           
21 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FOIA UPDATE: PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ISSUE 
NEW FOIA POLICY MEMORANDA (Jan. 1, 1993), https://www.justice.gov/oip/blog/foia-
update-president-and-attorney-general-issue-new-foia-policy-memoranda 
[https://perma.cc/D7Q3-5TJE]. 
22 Memmel, supra note 20, at 10. 
23 Id. (quoting Press Release, U.S. House Comm. on Oversight and Reform, Chaffetz, 
Cummings, Issa Applaud Passage of Bipartisan FOIA Reform Bill (June 13, 2016), 
https://oversight.house.gov/news/press-releases/chaffetz-cummings-issa-applaud-passage-of-
bipartisan-foia-reform-bill [https://perma.cc/L66D-V3ND]). 
24 Id. More information on the “foreseeable harm standard” is provided at infra notes 120–
126. 
25 FOIA Project Staff, Defensive Standards Hinder FOIA Openness, FOIA PROJECT (Mar. 
1, 2012), http://foiaproject.org/2012/03/01/defensive-standards-hinder-foia-openness/ 
[https://perma.cc/2BZL-LZ2L]. 
26 Id. (citing John Ashcroft, Memorandum for Heads of All Federal Departments and 
Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB84/Ashcroft%20Memorandum.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9CYP-MFPC]). 
27 Ashcroft, supra note 26. 
28 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 588 F.2d 863, 865 (2d Cir. 1978). 
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It took two sessions of Congress to pass what would eventually become 
FOIA. The first iteration of the legislation, introduced in the Senate in June 
1963,29 did not include Exemption 4, which was later added as part of an 
amendment, along with other exemptions.30 The original statutory language 
of Exemption 4 permitted agencies to withhold “trade secrets and other 
information obtained from the public and customarily privileged or 
confidential.”31 One Senate report states that the exemption was intended to 
“protect the confidentiality of information which is obtained by the 
Government through questionnaires or other inquiries, but which would 
customarily not be released to the public by the person from whom it was 
obtained.”32 The report lists various types of information that would be 
covered by the exemption, including sales data, lists of inventories and 
customers, and processes involved in manufacturing.33 The Senate passed 
that version of the legislation in July 1964,34 but the House failed to take up 
the bill before adjourning for the session, so the legislation died.35 
The Senate then took up FOIA the following session and passed a 
version of the bill that was substantially the same as the previous one, but 
with some changes, including two modifications to the statutory language of 
Exemption 4.36 Instead of “trade secrets and other information obtained 
from the public and customarily privileged or confidential,” the amended 
exemption covered “trade secrets and commercial or financial information 
obtained from the public and privileged or confidential.”37 The words “other 
information” were replaced with “commercial or financial information.”38 
The word “customarily” also was omitted.39 No reasons were given for these 
changes.40 The Senate report concluded: “The committee feels that this bill, 
as amended, would establish a much-needed policy of disclosure, while 
balancing the necessary interests of confidentiality.”41 
A subsequent House report from 1966 offers additional context for 
the purpose of the modifications, stating that the exemption would cover 
                                                           
29 SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
93D CONG., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, 
CASES, ARTICLES 8 (Comm. Print 1974). 




34 SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
93D CONG., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, 
CASES, ARTICLES 8 (Comm. Print 1974). 






41 S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 10 (1965). 
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“information which is given to an agency in confidence, since a citizen must 
be able to confide in his Government. Moreover, where the Government 
has obligated itself in good faith not to disclose documents or information 
which it receives, it should be able to honor such obligations.”42 The report 
also added another example of information that would be covered under 
Exemption 4: information submitted to the government about negotiations 
between labor and management.43  
The Senate passed the second iteration of the legislation in October 
1965, further augmenting the description of Exemption 4.44 According to 
the Congressional Record, the exemption would cover “any commercial, 
technical, and financial data submitted by an applicant or a borrower to a 
lending agency in connection with any loan application or loan.”45 The bill 
subsequently passed the House in June 1966.46 
There is evidence that lawmakers were made aware of concerns about 
disclosure of commercial and financial information. In testimony submitted 
to Congress in connection with the 1963 FOIA bill, the DOJ expressed 
apprehension about “the large body of the Government's information 
involving private business data.”47 Disclosing such information, the DOJ 
said, could harm competitors and chill cooperation between industry and 
governmental regulators.48 Congress did not formally respond to this 
concern. 
Congressional intent on whether there must be a showing of harm is 
demonstrated by the Food Marketing Institute’s (FMI’s) and the Argus 
Leader’s differing interpretations of the contemporaneous Senate and 
House reports. FMI’s brief before the Supreme Court cited the Senate and 
the House Reports “accompanying the bill that became FOIA.”49 Based on 
the Senate Report explanation, the brief argued that Exemption 4 “gives 
federal agencies discretion to withhold non-governmental commercial or 
financial information that ‘would customarily not be released to the public 
                                                           
42 H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 31 (1966). 
43 Id. 
44 111 CONG. REC. S26820, at 26823 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1965). 
45 Id. 
46 SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
93D CONG., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, 
CASES, ARTICLES 8 (Comm. Print 1974). 
47 Freedom of Information: Hearing on S. 1666 and S. 1663 (in part) Before the Subcomm. 
on Admin. Practice & Procedure of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 199 (1963) 
(statement of Norbert A. Schlei, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Department 
of Justice). 
48 Id. 
49 Brief for Petitioner at 22, Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356 (2019) 
(No. 18-481), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-
481/88748/20190215204958915_1.%20Brief%20on%20the%20Merits.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/73VS-FLCP] [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. 
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by the person from whom it was obtained.’”50 FMI claimed that the House 
Report’s definition was “nearly identical: Exemption 4 ‘exempts such 
material if it would not customarily be made public by the person from 
whom it was obtained by the Government.’”51 The brief, therefore, argued 
that Exemption 4 applies to all information falling under these definitions, 
“not just information whose disclosure would ‘cause substantial competitive 
harm.’”52 
Conversely, the brief filed by the Argus Leader disputed FMI’s use of 
the Senate and House Reports regarding the drafting of FOIA.53 The brief 
argued that FOIA’s legislative history “is notoriously flawed.”54 Additionally, 
the brief contended that FMI’s reliance on a single statement in the reports—
that information is “confidential” if it “customarily not be released to the 
public by the person from whom it was obtained”—was a “snippet . . . 
recycled from reports issued on the FOIA bill from the prior year, which 
unlike the final law, expressly used the word ‘customarily,’” a word that was 
later removed from the bill before it was passed.55 The brief explained that 
the Senate “simply failed to alter its earlier report,” and “the House 
committee seven months later copied most of the Senate committee 
report.”56 
Some of the motivation behind Exemption 4 is made clear in the 
Senate and House reports. These documents demonstrate that Congress 
intended to protect financial and commercial information given to the 
government in confidence, with the intention that the government would 
not disclose such materials to the public.57 The reports provided several 
examples, ranging from sales data to loan applications to labor negotiations. 
However, what is less clear from the legislative history is whether 
Congress meant for federal agencies to also show some level of harm to 
justify withholding documents under Exemption 4. Not only is this not 
explicitly discussed in the congressional documents, it is also an issue of 
contemporaneous debate, including before, and by, the Supreme Court. 
                                                           
50 Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9 (1965)). 
51 Id. at 23 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 10 (1965)). The brief added that the report “also 
specifies that the exemption applies to ‘information which is given to an agency in confidence, 
since a citizen must be able to confide in his Government,’ and ‘where the Government has 
obligated itself in good faith not to disclose documents or information which it receives.’” Id. 
52 Id. at 22. 
53 Brief for Respondent at 51, Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356 
(2019) (No. 18-481), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-
481/92325/20190318174331610_190309%20Brief%20for%20E-Filing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9NK4-FE2G] [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. 
54 Id. at 51 (citing Kenneth C. Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 761, 789–90 (1967); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 
546, 568 (2005); Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 459 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
55 Id. at 52. 
56 Id. (citing Davis, supra note 54, at 790). 
57 See 111 CONG. REC. S26820, at 26823 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1965). 
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Accordingly, it is unclear, based on the legislative history alone, whether 
Congress meant for harm to be part of Exemption 4. Congress should, 
therefore, resolve this question that it left open more than four decades ago. 
C. Circuit Rulings Regarding the Substantial Harm Test and Exemption 4 
The DOJ has noted that “[b]y far, most Exemption 4 litigation has 
focused on whether or not requested information is ‘confidential’ for 
purposes of Exemption 4.”58 The DOJ’s Freedom of Information Act 
Guide, published in 2004, explained that in the early years of FOIA, courts 
determined the application of Exemption 4 on “whether there was a 
promise of confidentiality by the government to the submitting party, or 
whether the information was of the type not customarily released to the 
public by the submitter.”59 
This changed in 1974 when the D.C. Circuit ruled in National Parks 
& Conservation Assn. v. Morton that, in addition to the requirements set 
forth in Exemption 4, a “court must also be satisfied that non-disclosure is 
justified by the legislative purpose which underlies the exemption.”60 The 
court, therefore, created a two-part test to determine whether information 
is, in fact, “confidential” under Exemption 4. The court held that: 
[A] commercial or financial matter is “confidential” for purposes 
of the exemption if disclosure of the information is likely to have 
either of the following effects: (1) to impair the Government's 
ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to 
cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person 
from whom the information was obtained.61 
Most recently, in its 2001 ruling in Contract Freighters, Inc. v. 
Secretary of U.S. Department of Transportation, the Eighth Circuit noted 
that it, and almost every federal circuit court in addition to the D.C. Circuit, 
had adopted the National Parks two-part test,62 including the First,63 
                                                           
58 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 7. 
59 Id. (citing GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1969); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 
450 F.2d 698, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1971); M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 471 
(D.D.C. 1972)). 
60 Food Mktg. Inst., 139 S. Ct. at 2363–64 (citing Nat’l Parks & Conservation Assn. v. Morton, 
498 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).  
61 Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n, 498 F.2d at 770. 
62 Contract Freighters, Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 260 F.3d 858, 861 (8th Cir. 
2001); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 7. The DOJ’s “Freedom of Information 
Act Guide” provides an extensive discussion of how the different circuits have applied the 
test on a case-by-case basis. The guide also provides extensive discussions on other court 
applications of Exemption 4, though those are less relevant for the purposes of this article. 
Id. 
63 9 to 5 Org. for Women Office Workers v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 721 
F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1983). 
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Second,64 Third,65 Fourth,66 Fifth,67 Seventh,68 Ninth,69 and Tenth Circuits.70 
The Eighth Circuit ultimately applied the National Parks test, finding that 
Contract Freighters, a freight logistics and motor carrier company, needed 
to demonstrate that “substantial competitive harm was likely to result from 
disclosure” of “certain financial data submitted to the Department of 
Transportation (DOT).”71 
In its FOIA guide, the DOJ explained that in Critical Mass Energy 
Project v. NRC, the D.C. Circuit added a “third prong” to the test to 
determine whether “other governmental interests—such as compliance and 
program effectiveness,” were at stake.72 The DOJ subsequently issued policy 
guidance following the ruling in 1992, focusing particularly on “intrinsically 
valuable” records, namely those that “are significant not for their content, 
but as valuable commodities which can be sold in the marketplace.”73  
However, the majority of Exemption 4 cases, as would be the case in 
Food Marketing Institute, have “involved the competitive harm prong of the 
test for confidentiality established in National Parks,”74 with courts tending 
“to resolve issues of competitive harm on a case-by-case basis rather than by 
establishing general guidelines.”75  
III. FOOD MARKETING INSTITUTE V. ARGUS LEADER MEDIA 
On June 24, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court held in a 6-3 ruling that 
Exemption 4 of FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4), allows a federal agency to 
withhold “confidential” commercial or financial information when it is 
“customarily and actually” treated as private by the owner of the information 
and is provided to the government under an assurance of privacy.76 In an 
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Stephen Breyer 
                                                           
64 Cont’l Stock Transfer & Trust Co. v. S.E.C., 566 F.2d 373, 375 (2d Cir. 1977). 
65 OSHA Data/CIH, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 220 F.3d 153, 162 n. 24, 167–68 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
66 Hercules, Inc. v. Marsh, 839 F.2d 1027, 1029 (4th Cir. 1988). 
67 Cont’l Oil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 519 F.2d 31, 35 (5th Cir. 1975). 
68 Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 750 F.2d 1394, 1398 (7th Cir. 1984). 
69 GC Micro Corp. v. Def. Logistics Agency, 33 F.3d 1109, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 1994). 
70 Anderson v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 944 (10th Cir. 1990). 
71 Contract Freighters Inc. v. Sec’y of United States Dep’t of Transp., 260 F.3d 858, 859–60 
(8th Cir. 2001). 
72 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 7 (citing Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 
871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1992); FOIA Update, Vol. XIV, No. 2, at 7 (“Exemption 4 Under 
Critical Mass: Step-By-Step Decision-making”); National Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. 
Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). 
73 Id. (citing FOIA Update, Vol. VI, No. 1, at 3–4 (“OIP Guidance: Protecting Intrinsic 
Commercial Value”). 
74 Id. (citing Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n, 498 F.2d at 770). 
75 Id.  
76 Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2359 (2019).  
10
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 2
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss3/2
2020] MORE “SUBSTANTIAL HARM” THAN GOOD 507 
  
contended that Exemption 4 should require a showing of at least some 
harm.77  
A. Facts 
The case arose when the Argus Leader, a newspaper in Sioux Falls, 
South Dakota, filed a FOIA request for data collected by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) regarding the national food-stamp 
program, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP).78 The 
newspaper was investigating the practice of “trafficking,” in which “SNAP 
recipients sell their benefits for cash at a discount to food retailers,” with 
some estimates stating that “approximately ten percent of participating 
retailers engage in trafficking.”79 
The FOIA request sought names and addresses of all retail stores that 
participated in SNAP, as well as each store’s redemption data from 2005 to 
2010, referred to as “store-level SNAP data.”80 As the Argus Leader 
explained in its brief before the Supreme Court, the redemption data is not 
information retailers are required to submit to the USDA.81 Instead, the 
USDA “automatically obtains that information when SNAP transactions are 
electronically processed.”82 
The USDA released the names and addresses but refused to disclose 
the store-level SNAP data.83 The USDA cited Exemption 4, which, 
according to the DOJ guidance, protects two types of records: “trade secrets 
and commercial or financial information obtained from a person [that is] 
privileged or confidential.”84  
In 2016, the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota held 
a two-day bench trial to determine whether disclosure of the store-level 
SNAP data would cause substantial competitive harm to participating stores 
and retailers.85 During the trial, the USDA testified that “retailers closely 
guard store-level SNAP data and that disclosure would threaten stores’ 
                                                           
77 Id. at 2366–69 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
78 Id. at 2361.  
79 Argus Leader Media v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 740 F.3d 1172, 1174 (8th Cir. 2014) (adding 
that an “estimated $858 million per year is ‘trafficked’”). 
80 Id. 
81 Brief for Respondent, supra note 53, at 19. 
82 Id. at 19 (adding that the “USDA itself, ‘not any retailer, generates the information, and the 
underlying data is ‘obtained’ from third-party payment processors, not from individual 
retailers”); see also Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-334 (2018), 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/hr2/text [https://perma.cc/FC6X-KQUF]. 
83 Brief for Respondent, supra note 53, at 21. 
84 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 7 (emphasis added) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) 
(2000)). 
85 Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2361 (2019) (citing Argus Leader 
Media v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 224 F. Supp. 3d 827, 832–35 (D.S.D. 2016)). 
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competitive positions,” in part because store-level SNAP data “could create 
a windfall for competitors” for three reasons:  
[1.] Stores with high SNAP redemptions could see increased 
competition for SNAP customers from existing competitors, 
[2.] new market entrants could use SNAP data to determine 
where to build their stores, and 
[3.] [competitors could use SNAP data to determine] a rival 
retailer’s overall sales and develop strategies to win some of that 
business too.86 
The Argus Leader countered that such harm would not be 
“substantial,” and the district court agreed.87 
The Food Marketing Institute (FMI), a trade association representing 
grocery retailers, intervened in the case and appealed the decision to the 
Eighth Circuit, which held that the district court “did not clearly err in 
finding SNAP redemption data not exempt from disclosure under FOIA 
exemption for confidential commercial information.”88 The Eighth Circuit 
rejected FMI’s argument that the court “should discard the ‘substantive 
competitive harm’ test in favor of the ordinary public meaning of the 
statutory term ‘confidential.’”89 The court further held that “the evidence 
[did] not support a finding” that releasing the contested data was “likely to 
cause substantial competitive harm.”90 
B. Arguments 
On February 15, 2019, FMI filed its brief before the Supreme Court.91 
The brief first argued that the word “‘[c]onfidential’ is an unambiguous word 
with a longstanding, ordinary meaning,”92 namely, “something that is private 
and not publicly disclosed.”93 The brief further argued that in U.S. 
Department of Justice v. Landano, the Supreme Court had held that the 
word “confidential” in Exemption 7 of FOIA94 had the “plain meaning [of] 
                                                           
86 Id.  
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 2362 (citing Argus Leader Media v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 889 F.3d 914, 915 
(8th Cir. 2018)). 
89 Id. at 2359. 
90 Argus Leader Media, 889 F.3d at 916. 
91 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 49. 
92 Id. at 12. 
93 Id.  
94 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (2018) (“[R]ecords or information compiled for law enforcement 
purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or 
information . . . could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, 
including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which 
furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information 
compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or 
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private information that is not publicly disclosed,”95 and that there was no 
requirement to show harm from the disclosure of the information at issue 
to justify denying the request. The brief further argued that Congress “chose 
not to give ‘confidential’ a different definition for FOIA; it chose to use an 
ordinary term in common usage.”96 
Second, the brief contended that the test crafted by the D.C. Circuit 
was “atextual,”97 meaning it “disregarded Exemption 4’s plain text.”98 The 
brief argued that the “atextual test is unworkable, unduly complex, and 
unpredictable.”99 The brief added, “There is no serious argument that 
Congress itself endorsed a reading that so departs from the words that it 
used. All that the lower courts have left is circuit-level stare decisis, which of 
course does not bind [the Supreme] Court.”100 
Finally, FMI contended that the data the Argus Leader requested “fits 
easily within the ordinary definition of ‘confidential.’”101 The brief reasoned 
that the newspaper had “not disputed that retailers carefully safeguard this 
information or that USDA represented to retailers that it would keep such 
information confidential pursuant to the agency’s longstanding policies.”102 
The brief argued that the information was, therefore, “not subject to 
mandatory disclosure under FOIA, and USDA may withhold that 
information.”103 The brief added that even if the National Parks test was 
applied, there was “a reasonable possibility that disclosure might harm 
commercial or financial interests.”104 
The Argus Leader’s brief contended that FMI lacked Article III 
standing under the U.S. Constitution because the Solicitor General’s brief 
to the Court noted that the USDA had “decided it would disclose the 
requested government-spending records here, no matter how this Court 
rules on Exemption 4, so long as it has discretion to do so.”105 Accordingly, 
the Argus Leader argued that the petitioner could not “show a favorable 
                                                           
by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information 
furnished by a confidential source . . . .”). 
95 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 49, at 19–21 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Landano, 508 
U.S. 165, 173 (1993); Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 356 (1982); Gray v. Netherland, 
518 U.S. 152, 182 (1996); United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 534 
(1961); Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954)). The brief further argued that the 
Supreme Court gave “‘personal privacy’ the same plain meaning in both Exemptions 6 and 
7(C).” Id. (quoting FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 407–08 (2011)).  
96 Id. at 3. 
97 Id.  
98 Id. at 23. 
99 Id. at 3. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 43. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 46. 
104 Id. at 47. 
105 Brief for Respondent, supra note 53, at 8. 
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ruling on Exemption 4 would likely prevent USDA from releasing the 
requested records. Exemption 4 does not forbid the Government from 
releasing anything. It simply provides the Government with discretion.”106 
Second, the Argus Leader argued that for “over 40 years, the courts of 
appeals have read [Exemption 4] to require a showing of likely competitive 
harm,” meaning there was “no basis to discard that uniform 
interpretation.”107 Third, the Argus Leader contended that because 
Congress did not define “confidential” commercial information, the Court 
needed to look “to dictionaries, the common law, and other sources of 
interpretive guidance.”108 The Argus Leader’s brief argued that dictionaries 
“are not dispositive, but the common law is.”109 The brief explained that 
when FOIA was enacted, the common law “protected against disclosure of 
confidential business information if the disclosure would cause competitive 
harm.”110 According to the brief, “[i]n other words, ‘confidential commercial 
information’ was a term of art at common law meaning business information 
that would cause competitive harm if disclosed.”111 
The Argus Leader’s brief further argued that Congress would have 
looked for the definition of trade secrets in the first Restatement of Torts, 
which referred to “trade secrets and other confidential commercial 
information” as “non-public business information, disclosure of which 
would . . . likely cause competitive harm if released.”112 According to the 
Argus Leader, courts “have long embraced this same usage. They have often 
addressed both ‘trade secrets’ and ‘confidential business information’ in the 
same breath to refer to all non-public commercial information that would 
likely cause competitive harm, and thus be tortious, if disclosed.”113 The 
brief therefore concluded that when drafting Exemption 4, Congress meant 
for there to be a showing of harm if disclosure was to be denied. 
Fourth, the Argus Leader asserted that the longstanding competitive 
harm standard “must be retained [because] Congress has reenacted the text 
and ratified the standard 60 times.”114 The brief contended that “Congress, 
well aware of the uniformly adopted judicial construction, has repeatedly 
ratified the longstanding competitive-harm standard by incorporating 
Exemption 4 and its text into 60 other provisions across the U.S. Code.”115 
Finally, the brief argued that FMI’s “sweeping interpretation of 
‘confidential’ would undermine FOIA’s core objective of, as this Court has 
                                                           
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 9. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 10. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 29 (citing Restatement of Torts § 757, cmt. B (Am. Law Inst. 1939)). 
113 Id. at 31. 
114 Id. at 10. 
115 Id. at 25. 
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put it, allowing the public to learn ‘what the Government is up to.’”116 The 
Argus Leader continued: 
It would make it far more difficult for the press and public to 
uncover evidence of government waste, fraud, and dereliction of 
duty. That is because the public must examine some data 
submitted to the Government (e.g., contractor prices) to know 
what the Government is spending public money on. The public 
must also be able to examine what private parties submit to the 
Government (e.g., compliance reports) to assess how and 
whether the Government is wielding its expansive regulatory 
powers.117 
Among several other amicus briefs,118 the Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press (RCFP) and thirty-six media organizations filed a brief 
in support of the Argus Leader.119 The brief argued that the National Parks 
standard was consistent with the “foreseeable harm standard,” codified as 
part of the 2016 amendments to FOIA.120 This provision states that a federal 
agency may withhold information under this standard only if it “reasonably 
foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by an exemption 
described in subsection (b); or . . . disclosure is prohibited by law.”121 The 
standard further requires that agencies “(I) consider whether partial 
disclosure of information is possible whenever the agency determines that a 
full disclosure of a requested record is not possible; and (II) take reasonable 
steps necessary to segregate and release nonexempt information.”122  
The brief cited the First Circuit’s ruling in 9 to 5 Organization for 
Women Office Workers v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System,123 in which the court “presciently described the ‘principle to be 
derived from National Parks[], and the cases which have followed it.’”124 
Accordingly, the court argued that “[i]nformation will not be regarded as 
confidential under Exemption 4 unless it can be demonstrated that 
disclosure will harm a specific interest that Congress sought to protect by 
enacting the exemption.”125 The brief argued that the “plain text of the 
                                                           
116 Id. at 11. 
117 Id. 
118 Among the parties that filed briefs were Retail Litigation Center, Inc., Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States of America, the Electronic Privacy Information Center, 
Freedom of Information Act and First Amendment Scholars, and several others. 
119 Brief of Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Respondent at 1–2, Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356 (2019) (No. 
18-481), https://www.rcfp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/2019-03-25-FMI-v-Argus-
Leader.pdf [https://perma.cc/2C52-SM98] [hereinafter Brief of Reporters Committee]. 
120 Id. at 5; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A) (2018). 
121 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A). 
122 Id. 
123 721 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1983). 
124 Brief of Reporters Committee, supra note 119, at 18. 
125 Id. at 19 (citing 9 to 5 Org. for Women Office Workers, 721 F.2d at 9). 
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foreseeable harm standard requires the government to demonstrate (1) 
harm to an interest protected by a FOIA exemption—here, the competitive 
position of a third party—and (2) a reasonable likelihood that harm will 
occur.”126 
RCFP and the media organizations also argued that there is a “strong 
public interest in access to records regarding expenditures of public 
funds.”127 The brief continued, “FOIA is a powerful tool used by journalists, 
news organizations, and the public to monitor how the government spends 
tax dollars,” such as previously using “SNAP data to determine which 
private companies obtain the greatest benefits from government subsidies. 
Similar records also allow the public to understand which companies the 
government selects for lucrative contracts.”128 
C. Justice Gorsuch’s Opinion 
Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the majority opinion of the Supreme 
Court. He first contended that the Eighth Circuit, among other appellate 
courts, had “engrafted onto Exemption 4 a so-called ‘competitive harm’ test, 
under which commercial information cannot be deemed ‘confidential’ 
unless disclosure is ‘likely . . . to cause substantial harm to the competitive 
position of the person from whom the information was obtained.’”129 
Second, Justice Gorsuch held that FMI had Article III standing under 
the U.S. Constitution to pursue the appeal, reasoning that although the issue 
before the Court was whether its member retailers would suffer “substantial 
competitive harm,” there was no doubt that the disclosure of the SNAP data 
would cause “some financial injury.”130 
Third, Justice Gorsuch held that because FOIA does not define the 
term “confidential,” the Court must determine what the term’s “ordinary, 
contemporary, common meaning” was when Congress enacted FOIA in 
                                                           
126 Id. at 19–20 (“The 2016 amendments to the Act include an unambiguous direction from 
Congress that a showing of foreseeable harm to an interest protected by a discretionary FOIA 
exemption must be made before records may be withheld. Thus, even if the Court does not 
adopt the National Parks test for Exemption 4 now, current and future FOIA requests will 
be governed by an essentially, if not entirely, identical standard. Indeed, as noted above, the 
Argus Leader can simply file a new FOIA request today that would require the Food and 
Drug Administration to apply the foreseeable harm standard.”). The brief makes several 
additional arguments, including that the public had a “strong interest in understanding how 
the government spends tax dollars and contracts with private parties,” among other claims. 
Id. at 20. For more information on how federal courts have interpreted the foreseeable harm 
standard in relation to Exemption 4, see Al-Amyn Sumar, Unpacking FOIA’s “Foreseeable 
Harm” Standard, COMM. LAW., Winter 2020, at 15, 18–20. 
127 Id. at 6. 
128 Id. at 6–7. 
129 Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2361 (2019) (emphasis added) 
(citing Argus Leader Media v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 889 F.3d 915, 915 (2018)). 
130 Id. at 2362 (internal quotations omitted). 
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1966.131 Justice Gorsuch concluded based on definitions in “contemporary 
dictionaries” that the term meant “private” or “secret” and must meet two 
conditions, including that the information “communicated to another 
remains confidential whenever it is customarily kept private . . . by the 
person imparting it” and that the information “might be considered 
confidential only if the party receiving it provides some assurance that it will 
remain secret.”132 Taken together, the two conditions posit that the financial 
information is “customarily and actually” treated as private. 
Justice Gorsuch found that FMI had met the first condition because its 
retailers “customarily do not disclose store-level SNAP data or make it 
publicly available ‘in any way.’”133 Justice Gorsuch held that the retailers had 
“clearly” satisfied the second condition: “Can privately held information 
lose its confidential character for purposes of Exemption 4 if it’s 
communicated to the government without assurances that the government 
will keep it private?”134 He reasoned that the government, to induce retailers 
to participate in SNAP and provide store-level information to the USDA, 
“has long promised them that it will keep their information private.”135 
Therefore, Justice Gorsuch concluded that the data at issue qualified as 
“confidential” data under Exemption 4.136 
Fourth, Justice Gorsuch turned to the “substantial competitive harm” 
requirement articulated by the D.C. Circuit in National Parks and by several 
additional federal circuit courts.137 He wrote that the Court could not 
“approve such a casual disregard of the rules of statutory interpretation” and 
refused to “alter FOIA’s plain terms on the strength only of arguments from 
legislative history.”138 Justice Gorsuch called the D.C. Circuit’s approach a 
“relic from a ‘bygone era of statutory construction,’” because, among other 
reasons, the appellate court had “relied heavily on statements from 
witnesses in congressional hearings years earlier on a different bill that was 
never enacted into law.”139 
Finally, Justice Gorsuch rejected several arguments by the Argus 
Leader attempting to salvage the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit, including 
that Congress had “effectively ratified its understanding of the term 
‘confidential’ by enacting similar phrases in other statutes in the years since 
that case was decided.”140 Justice Gorsuch held that although “the ratification 
                                                           
131 Id. (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)) (internal quotations omitted). 
132 Id. at 2363 (internal quotations omitted). 
133 Id. 
134 Id.  
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 2363–64 (citing Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 767 
(D.C. Cir. 1974)).  
138 Id. at 2364. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 2365. 
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canon can sometimes prove a useful interpretive tool,”141 Congress had 
never “reenacted” Exemption 4, meaning its use of similar language in other 
statutes after the D.C. Circuit’s ruling “tells us nothing about Congress’s 
understanding of the language it enacted in Exemption 4 in 1966.”142 
The Argus Leader had argued that the “substantial competitive harm” 
requirement should be adopted because FOIA exemptions are to be 
“narrowly construed,”143 meaning its scope does not cover more records 
than Congress intended. Justice Gorsuch rejected this argument as well, 
reasoning that the Court had “no license to give [statutory] exemption[s] 
anything but a fair reading.”144 
Thus, Justice Gorsuch concluded that “[a]t least where commercial or 
financial information is both customarily and actually treated as private by 
its owner and provided to the government under an assurance of privacy,” 
the information is “‘confidential’ within the meaning of Exemption 4.”145 He 
continued, “Because the store-level SNAP data at issue here is confidential 
under that construction, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed 
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.”146 
D. Justice Breyer’s Opinion 
In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Stephen 
Breyer, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor, 
agreed with the two conditions set out by Justice Gorsuch but added that 
“there is a third: Release of such information must also cause genuine harm 
to the owner’s economic or business interests.”147 
Justice Breyer wrote that he agreed that the D.C. Circuit’s test in 
National Parks “[went] too far.”148 He reasoned that he could “find nothing 
in FOIA’s language, purposes, or history that imposes so stringent a 
requirement,” which would create several problems, including “long, 
onerous court proceedings” to determine whether something qualifies as 
“substantial.”149 However, Justice Breyer disagreed “with the majority’s 
decision to jump to the opposite conclusion, namely, that Exemption 4 
imposes no ‘harm’ requirement whatsoever.”150 
                                                           
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 2366. 
143 Id. 




147 Id. at 2366–67 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
148 Id. at 2367. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 2368. 
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Justice Breyer reasoned that the word “confidential” sometimes 
referred to, “at least in the national security context, . . . information the 
disclosure of which would cause harm.”151 Second, he contended that the 
majority’s reading of Exemption 4 was “at odds with [the] principles” of 
FOIA, including that the mandate of the statute is the “broad disclosure of 
Government records.”152 He continued, “The whole point of the FOIA is to 
give the public access to information it cannot otherwise obtain. So the fact 
that private actors have ‘customarily and actually treated’ commercial 
information as secret cannot be enough to justify nondisclosure.”153 Justice 
Breyer added,  
[A] statute designed to take from the government the power to 
unilaterally decide what information the public can view put such 
determinative weight on the government’s preference for secrecy. 
. . . I fear the majority’s reading will deprive the public of 
information for reasons no better than convenience, skittishness, 
or bureaucratic inertia.154 
Therefore, Justice Breyer concluded that “Exemption 4 can be 
satisfied where, in addition to the conditions set out by the majority, release 
of commercial or financial information will cause genuine harm to an 
owner’s economic or business interests.”155 
E. Commentary about the Ruling 
Following the decision, several observers expressed concern with the 
majority’s ruling, particularly its impact on the news media’s ability to cover 
matters of public interest. Argus Leader news director, Cory Myers, said in 
a June 17, 2019, statement that he was “disappointed” in the outcome of the 
case.156 “This is a massive blow to the public’s right to know how its tax 
dollars are being spent, and who is benefiting,” he said. “Regardless, we will 
continue to fight for government openness and transparency, as always.”157 
Maribel Perez Wadsworth, president of the USA Today Network, the 
parent company of the Argus Leader, also expressed disappointment in the 
ruling.158 “[The court’s decision] effectively gives businesses relying on 
taxpayer dollars the ability to decide for themselves what data the public will 
                                                           
151 Id. 
152 Id. (citing CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)) (internal quotations omitted). 
153 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
154 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
155 Id. at 2369. 
156 Bovard, supra note 13. 
157 See Jonathan Ellis and Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Limits Access to Government 
Records in Loss for Argus Leader, Part of the USA TODAY Network, USA TODAY (June 
24, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/06/24/freedom-information-
act-supreme-court-rules-south-dakota-case/1475089001/ [https://perma.cc/T7Z2-KMEU]. 
158 Gresko, supra note 13. 
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see about how that money is spent,” she said in a statement.159 “This is a step 
backward for openness and a misreading of the very purpose of the 
Freedom of Information Act.”160 
In a June 24, 2019, SCOTUSblog post, Mark Fenster, the Stephen C. 
O’Connell Chair at the Levin College of Law at the University of Florida, 
predicted that the ruling would “frustrate news media, watchdogs and 
competitors who will be less likely to have their FOIA requests met.”161 
Fenster added that “the majority never explained that the Argus Leader 
submitted its FOIA request as part of its investigation into SNAP-related 
fraud” and that the investigation would “now have to proceed without access 
to the SNAP data.”162 
In a June 24, 2019, tweet, Argus Leader reporter, Jonathan Ellis, 
agreed, writing, “[T]oday six members of the U.S. Supreme Court used it 
as a vehicle to wipe out more than 40 years of established #FOIA 
precedent.”163 In a tweet on the same day, RCFP attorney, Adam A. 
Marshall, also criticized the ruling, similarly writing that the Supreme Court 
had “wiped out” forty-five years of precedent related to Exemption 4, citing 
the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in National Parks.164  
IV. DISCUSSION 
This article joins other commentators in arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Food Market Institute fails to protect important public 
interests in government transparency, newsgathering, and the free flow of 
information. In particular, Congressional action is needed to clarify key 
questions related to Exemption 4, as well as to ensure that the Exemption 
does not limit disclosure of information more than is necessary. In fact, a 
piece of legislation, already introduced by Congress,165 would help resolve 
the concerns that need to be addressed, demonstrating that Congressional 
action is not only necessary, but also possible. 
                                                           
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Fenster, supra note 13. 
162 Id. 
163 Jonathan Ellis (@argusjellis), TWITTER (June 24, 2019, 7:48 AM), 
https://twitter.com/argusjellis/status/1143169087499055105?s=20 
[https://perma.cc/WUV7-68VB]. 
164 Adam A. Marshall (@a_marshall_plan), TWITTER (June 24, 2019, 7:53 AM), 
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A. Necessary Congressional Action Related to the Harm Requirement 
Based on original research into the legislative history of FOIA 
Exemption 4, it is clear that a primary motivation behind the exemption was 
to protect information provided to a federal agency that was meant to be 
kept in confidence by the government.166 As a House Report explained in 
1966, Exemption 4 was included in the revised version of FOIA to protect 
“information which is given to an agency in confidence, since a citizen must 
be able to confide in his Government. Moreover, where the Government 
has obligated itself in good faith not to disclose documents or information 
which it receives, it should be able to honor such obligations.”167 Such 
materials include sales data, lists of inventories and customers, and 
processes involved in manufacturing,168 as well as “any commercial, 
technical, and financial data submitted by an applicant or a borrower to a 
lending agency in connection with any loan application or loan”169 and 
information submitted to the government about negotiations between labor 
and management.170 
However, Congressional documents stop short of clarifying a key 
debate that took place before the Supreme Court: whether Exemption 4 
requires a showing of harm, as federal circuit courts have required through 
the National Parks two-part test originally introduced by the D.C. Circuit in 
in 1974. At best, one could argue either that Congress implicitly required, 
or did not require, such a showing, as demonstrated by FMI’s and Argus 
Leader’s briefs before the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the disagreement 
between the majority and dissenting justices in the case further show that it 
remains unsettled whether Congress intended for harm to be required 
under Exemption 4. 
Put simply, the legislative history of the exemption is ambiguous and 
fails to resolve this key question. Congress has the ability to do so in the 
wake of Food Marketing Institute. Congressional action is necessary to limit 
the scope of Exemption 4 of FOIA by applying the reasoning of Justice 
Breyer, requiring that there be at least some requirement of harm caused 
by the disclosure of trade secrets to justify the withholding of records.171 
                                                           
166 See H. R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 31 (1966); 111 CONG. REC. S. 26820, at S. 26823 (daily 
ed. Oct. 13, 1965). 
167 H. R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 31 (1966). 
168 S. REP. NO. 88-1219, agency cmt. to S. 1666, subsec. (c) (1964). 
169 111 CONG. REC. 26820, at 26823 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1965). 
170 H. R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 31 (1966). 
171 See Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2369 (2019) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
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B. Exemptions Narrowly Construed: FCC v. AT&T 
As the Argus Leader argued, a substantial harm standard should be 
implemented to ensure Exemption 4 is narrowly construed.172 In its brief, 
the Argus Leader argued that the Supreme Court should “adopt a 
‘substantial competitive harm’ requirement as a matter of policy because it 
believes FOIA exemptions should be narrowly construed.”173 Justice 
Gorsuch refused to do so, reasoning that the Court could not 
“properly expand Exemption 4 beyond what its terms permit” and could 
not “arbitrarily constrict it either by adding limitations found nowhere in its 
terms.”174 
However, in its 2011 decision in Federal Communications 
Commission v. AT&T Inc., the Supreme Court did constrict the scope of 
Exemption 7(C),175 which permits agencies to withhold “personal” 
information contained within law enforcement records under certain 
conditions.176 Exemption 7(C) applies specifically to “records or information 
compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the 
production of such law enforcement records or information . . . could 
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy.”177 
The case arose from a FOIA request by CompTel, a trade organization 
representing competitors of AT&T, seeking “[a]ll pleadings and 
correspondence” related to the Federal Communications Commission’s 
(FCC) Enforcement Bureau’s investigation into AT&T.178 The investigation 
was launched after the company “voluntarily reported to the FCC that it 
might have overcharged the Government for services it provided” as part of 
the FCC-administered Education Rate program, which was meant to 
enhance access for schools and libraries to telecommunications and 
information services.179 As part of the investigation, AT&T provided 
“various documents, including responses to interrogatories, invoices, e-
mails with pricing and billing information, names and job descriptions of 
employees involved, and [the company’s] assessment of whether those 
employees had violated the company’s code of conduct.”180 The FCC and 
AT&T later reached a resolution in December 2004 in which AT&T, 
                                                           
172 Brief for Respondent, supra note 53, at 46. 
173 Food Mktg. Inst., 139 S. Ct. at 2360. 
174 Id. at 2366. 
175 See Fed. Comm. Comm’n v. AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 409 (2011). 
176 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2018).  
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without conceding liability, agreed to pay the government $500,000 and 
“institute a plan to ensure compliance with the program.”181  
AT&T argued that the FCC “could not lawfully release documents 
obtained during the course of an investigation into an alleged overcharging 
on the ground that disclosure would likely invade the company’s ‘personal 
privacy.’”182 
Regarding CompTel’s FOIA request, the FCC Enforcement Bureau 
raised the argument that Exemption 4 protected from disclosure some of 
the information provided by AT&T,183 specifically regarding the “cost and 
pricing data, billing-related information, and identifying information about 
staff, contractors, and customer representatives.”184 The Bureau also 
decided to withhold information under Exemption 7(C), but only 
information “[pertaining to] individuals identified in [AT&T’s] submission” 
because they have “privacy rights” protected by Exemption 7(C).185 The 
Bureau found that Exemption 7(C) did not apply to AT&T itself, reasoning 
that “businesses do not possess ‘personal privacy’ interests as required [by 
the exemption].”186 On review, the FCC agreed with the Bureau’s findings, 
concluding that AT&T’s argument that it was a “private corporate citizen” 
with personal privacy rights within the meaning of Exemption 7(C) was “at 
odds with established [FCC] and judicial precedent.”187 
The Third Circuit ultimately held that Exemption 7(C) 
“unambiguously indicates that a corporation may have a ‘personal privacy’ 
interest within the meaning of Exemption 7(C).”188 The court accepted 
AT&T’s argument that “the plain text of Exemption 7(C) indicates that it 
applies to corporations. After all, ‘personal’ is the adjectival form of 
‘person,’ and FOIA defines ‘person’ to include a corporation.”189 The Third 
Circuit added, “It would be very odd indeed for an adjectival form of a 
defined term not to refer back to that defined term. Further, FOIA’s 
exemptions indicate that Congress knew how to refer solely to human 
                                                           
181 Id. 
182 AT&T, Inc. v. Federal Comm. Comm’n, 582 F.3d 490, 492 (3d Cir. 2009). The court 
added that AT&T “submitted a letter to the Bureau opposing CompTel’s request, arguing 
that the FCC collected the documents that AT&T produced for law enforcement purposes 
and therefore that the FCC regulations implementing FOIA’s exemptions prohibited 
disclosure.” Id. at 439. 
183 Brief for Respondents at 16, AT&T, Inc. v. Fed. Comm. Comm’n, 582 F.3d 490 (3d Cir. 
2009) (No. 09-1279). 
184 AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. at 401. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. (citing In re SBC Communs., Inc., 23 FCC Rcd. 13704, 13707 (F.C.C. September 12, 
2008)). 
188 AT&T, Inc., 582 F.3d at 498. 
189 Id. at 497. 
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beings (to the exclusion of corporations and other legal entities) when it 
wanted to.”190 
AT&T argued that the Supreme Court should uphold the Third 
Circuit’s ruling, contending that the word “personal” in Exemption 7(C) 
“incorporates the statutory definition of ‘person,’” which includes 
corporations.191 AT&T also asserted that “its reading of ‘personal’ [was] 
supported by the common legal usage of the word ‘person.’”192 AT&T 
further contended that the Supreme Court had previously “recognized 
‘privacy’ interests of corporations in the Fourth Amendment and double 
jeopardy contexts.”193 
The Supreme Court held that corporations “do not have ‘personal 
privacy’ for the purposes of Exemption 7(C),” reversing the ruling of the 
Third Circuit.194 Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the opinion of the 
unanimous court and first rejected AT&T’s argument that the word 
“personal” in Exemption 7(C) incorporates the statutory definition of 
“person,” which includes corporations.195 He reasoned that “a noun and its 
adjective form may have meanings as disparate as any two unrelated words” 
and agreed with the FCC that “‘personal’ does not, in fact, derive from the 
English word ‘person,’ but instead developed along its own etymological 
path.”196  
Chief Justice Roberts further held that because “personal” was not 
defined in the statute, the Court needed to give the phrase “personal 
privacy” “its ordinary meaning.”197 He concluded that “[p]eople do not 
generally use terms such as personal characteristics or personal 
correspondence to describe the characteristics or correspondence of 
corporations.”198 Chief Justice Roberts added that “personal privacy . . . 
suggests a type of privacy evocative of human concerns—not the sort usually 
associated with an entity like AT&T.”199  
Chief Justice Roberts also looked to dictionary definitions of 
“personal,” finding that the term “does not ordinarily relate to artificial 
                                                           
190 Id. (citation omitted). 
191 AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. at 402. 
192 Id. at 398. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 397. 
195 Id. at 402. 
196 Id. at 403. 
197 Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 138 (2010)). 
198 Id. at 397. 
199 Id. at 398. Chief Justice Roberts continued, “Certainly, if the chief executive officer of a 
corporation approached the chief financial officer and said, ‘I have something personal to 
tell you,’ we would not assume the CEO was about to discuss company business. Responding 
to a request for information, an individual might say, ‘that’s personal.’ . . . In fact, we often 
use the word ‘personal’ to mean precisely the opposite of business related: We speak of 
personal expenses and business expenses, personal life and work life, personal opinion and 
a company’s view.” Id. at 403–04. 
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‘persons’ such as corporations.”200 Additionally, he turned to the context of 
the statutory language, holding that the phrase “personal privacy” has a 
“more particular meaning than those words in isolation.”201  
Lastly, Chief Justice Roberts rejected AT&T’s argument that the Court 
should recognize the privacy interest of corporations regarding Exemption 
7(C) just as it did in “the Fourth Amendment and double jeopardy 
contexts.”202 He reasoned that the present case did not require the Court to 
rule “on the scope of a corporation’s ‘privacy’ interests as a matter of 
constitutional or common law.”203 Instead, the Court only needed to rule on 
“[t]he discrete question [of] whether Congress used the term ‘personal 
privacy’ to refer to the privacy of artificial persons in FOIA Exemption 
7(C).”204 The Court held that AT&T had provided the Court with “no sound 
reason in the statutory text or context to disregard the ordinary meaning of 
the phrase ‘personal privacy.’”205 
Chief Justice Roberts also explained that Exemption 4 “clearly applies 
to corporations,” adding that Congress “did not use any language similar to 
that in Exemption 4 in Exemption 7(C).206 Chief Justice Roberts also noted 
that the Court had “regularly referred to Exemption 6207 as involving an 
‘individual’s right of privacy’” and that it contained the same phrase—
“personal privacy”—as Exemption 7(C).208 Thus, in this case, the Supreme 
Court drew a line, holding that although Exemption 4 applied to, and could 
be used by, corporations, Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C) did not.  
Whereas the majority in Food Marketing Institute used dictionary 
definitions of the statutory language to increase the scope of the material 
covered by Exemption 4 by rejecting a harm requirement,209 the unanimous 
court in AT&T, Inc. read the statutory language to restrict the scope of 
Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C), preventing AT&T and other 
corporations from trying to invoke an exemption that Congress did not 
intend to apply to corporations.210 
In a 2011 article in the Duquesne Business Law Journal, Josh Brick 
argued that the Court’s ruling in AT&T, Inc. was “in alignment with its 
previous observation that there is a strong presumption in favor of 
                                                           
200 Id. at 404. 
201 Id. at 406. 




206 Id. at 398. 
207 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2018). Exemption 6 allows agencies to withhold records containing 
information individuals in “personnel and medical files and similar files” when the disclosure 
of such information “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 
208 AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. at 398 (citing Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 175 (1991)). 
209 Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2363 (2019). 
210AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. at 408–09.  
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disclosure under FOIA.”211 He continued, “When read alongside 
Exemption 4 and Exception 6, it is evident that Congress did not view 
corporations as possessing an interest in personal privacy,” therefore 
narrowly interpreting Exemption 7(C).212 
However, in a 2011 article for CommLaw Conspectus, Maeve E. 
Huggins observed that the Court had also failed to address several key 
issues, providing little discussion, if any, regarding newsgathering and 
transparency.213 She wrote:  
FOIA is a crucial tool of journalists. Any impact on FOIA will 
undoubtedly change the way journalists obtain information from 
the government and monitor the [federal] government’s 
investigative and enforcement responses to wrongdoing. . . . As a 
matter of public policy, courts must preserve and protect FOIA 
as an effective means to “ensure an informed citizenry.”214 
Huggins added that in AT&T, Inc., the Court “failed to seize an opportunity 
to reaffirm the important values of government transparency and 
accountability in the face of private interests.”215 As the following section 
argues, the Court put these values at risk in Food Marketing Institute. 
Congressional action is required to ensure Exemption 4 is narrowly 
construed. 
C. Congressional Action Needed to Protect Newsgathering, Transparency, 
and the Free Flow of Information 
A second reason for Congressional action following Food Marketing 
Institute is that the Court, by shielding from disclosure an even broader 
range of materials under Exemption 4, makes it more difficult for the press 
and the public to obtain information about the government and the 
organizations with which it does business. The result is decreased 
government transparency and accountability as the press and public are able 
to receive and disseminate less information about these transactions, even if 
that information is of public concern. 
It is important to note that Food Marketing Institute was not about a 
secret, proprietary formula or about sensitive information implicating 
                                                           
211 Josh Brick, Case Note, The United States Supreme Court Holds that Exemption 7(C) of 
the Freedom of Information Act Does Not Apply to Corporations: FCC v. AT&T Inc., 14 
DUQ. BUS. L.J. 121, 141 (2012), http://sites.law.duq.edu/blj/wp-
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business competition.216 This case, in fact, arose from private companies 
working together with the government, raising important implications for 
government accountability. Additionally, the Argus Leader was investigating 
the practice of “trafficking” of benefits by SNAP recipients, demonstrating 
that there were issues of fraud, clearly constituting matters of significant 
public concern.217  
This article does not argue for the elimination of Exemption 4 because 
important interests do arise, justifying withholding propriety information or 
records whose disclosure would have significant effects on businesses’ ability 
to compete in the marketplace. In some instances, however, records that 
are subject to Exemption 4 transcend these types of situations, implicating 
matters of public concern. In such cases, especially where harm to 
businesses is unlikely and harm to the public is likely, the press and the 
public need access to relevant information to “know what their government 
is up to” and hold the government accountable.218 
D. Congress Has Introduced a Possible Solution 
Congress has already considered a piece of bipartisan legislation that 
can help accomplish those desired outcomes. On July 23, 2019, U.S. 
Senators Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa.), Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), John Cornyn (R-
Texas), and Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) introduced The Open and 
Responsive Government Act of 2019 (S. 2220).219 S. 2220, which, in early 
2020, remained in the Committee on the Judiciary, would add language to 
Exemption 4 to require that the term “confidential” include “information 
that, if disclosed, would likely cause substantial harm to the competitive 
position of the person from whom the information was obtained.”220 The 
                                                           
216 See Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2360–61 (2019) (indicating 
the case involved the disclosure of store-level SNAP data). 
217 Brief for Respondent, supra note 53, at 3–4.  
218 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773–
74 (1989) (citing EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80, 93 (1973) (Douglas J., dissenting) (emphasis 
omitted)). Justice Stevens cited Justice Douglas’s dissent in which he contended that the 
philosophy behind FOIA was “the principle that a democracy cannot function unless the 
people are permitted to know what their government is up to.” Id. 
219 Open and Responsive Government Act of 2019, S. 2220, 116th Cong. § 2(a) (2019), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/2220/text [https://perma.cc/P49C-
EQHS]; see also Beryl Lipton, Senate Introduces Legislation to Clarify Presumption of 
Disclosure in FOIA, MUCKROCK (June 24, 2019), 
https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2019/jul/24/Senate-FOIA-bill-b4/ 
[https://perma.cc/4P9S-356N]. 
220 Open and Responsive Government Act of 2019, S. 2220, 116th Cong. § 2(1) (2019), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/2220/text [https://perma.cc/P49C-
EQHS]. The new language under Exemption 4 would read, “(4) trade secrets and 
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential, 
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bill would incorporate the National Parks harm requirement as part of 
Exemption 4 and would, therefore, formally incorporate into the statutory 
language what was previously common law under circuit court rulings. 
The bill also clarifies that Exemption 4 would “not authorize the 
withholding of a portion of an otherwise responsive record on the basis that 
the portion is non-responsive.”221 The Hill had previously reported on June 
25, 2019 that, without a public comment period, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) approved a new rule that allowed EPA officials to 
review all materials that fit a FOIA request criteria, known as “responsive 
documents,” and then decide “whether to release or withhold a record or a 
portion of a record on the basis of responsiveness or under one or more 
exemptions under the FOIA, and to issue ‘no records’ responses,” 
prompting concern from observers, who called for Congress to intervene.222 
In a July 23, 2019 press release, Senator Grassley contended that the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Food Marketing Institute, by setting aside the 
National Parks standard, “significantly” broadened the scope of Exemption 
4.223 He argued that such a ruling made it “more difficult for the media and 
general public to learn about government programs and hold accountable 
those who administer them.”224 This prompted bipartisan support to 
“update[] FOIA Exemption 4 to include key accountability language from 
National Parks, ensuring continued access to information.”225 
In the press release, Senator Grassley further explained the reasoning 
behind the bill: 
The people’s business ought to be available to the people. It’s 
only through public oversight and transparency that we ensure 
government programs are operating as intended, without any 
waste, fraud, or abuse. Transparency is something worth fighting 
for, and it seems we’re always in an uphill battle to keep the 
sunlight shining on government. This balanced and bipartisan bill 
responds to recent court rulings and regulatory actions, restoring 
pro-transparency principles and making crystal clear where 
Congress stands on the public’s right to know.”226 
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Senator Leahy agreed, adding that the bill would “limit the extent to which the 
government can use a recent Supreme Court opinion to justify abuses of a 
particular FOIA exemption to withhold information.”227  
In a September 19, 2019, letter to U.S. Senators, the Campaign for 
Accountability, a nonprofit government watchdog organization, along with 
34 other civil society organizations, including the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU), called for the endorsement of S. 2220, particularly the 
provision that would codify the primary holding of National Parks.228 In 
particular, the letter argued that the Supreme Court had “greatly expanded 
[Exemption 4] . . . in such a way that the public may now have access only 
to information that is already openly shared.”229 The letter therefore called 
for Congress to amend FOIA to include the finding in National Parks that 
commercial information is exempt as confidential only if disclosure of such 
records would be likely to cause substantial harm.230 
S. 2220, by amending FOIA to include such a requirement, would 
clarify and provide meaningful resolution to the debate around this issue. 
Although the majority in Food Marketing Institute declined to create such 
a standard, incorporating a harm requirement would, as the Argus Leader 
contended,231 help narrow the scope of Exemption 4. At the very least, the 
result would be that more information would be disclosed about the 
business government agencies conduct with public and private 
organizations, even if trade secrets and other confidential commercial 
information are at issue. Congress would also be within the bounds of 
FOIA’s foreseeable harms standard, as asserted by RCFP and others.232  
S. 2220, or a bill like it, would encourage public access to information, 
as well as enhance the ability of the press not only to obtain and disseminate 
information of public concern, but also to provide greater accountability of 
the government and the private actors with whom they work. Not only is 
such Congressional action is needed, it is also clearly possible, as 
demonstrated by S. 2220.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 Although Food Marketing Institute, on the surface, helps to protect 
proprietary information under Exemption 4, it raises issues that require 
Congressional action. First, the Court reversed circuit-level precedent dating 
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230 Id. For additional commentary on how the Open and Responsive Government Act of 
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back to 1974 that had held that Exemption 4 required a showing of harm in 
order to prevent disclosure of requested materials. Because the legislative 
history behind such a requirement is ambiguous, Congress needs to step in 
to help resolve this critical issue by clarifying that such a demonstration of 
harm is necessary under the statutory language.  
Second, this article argues that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Food 
Marketing Institute broadened the scope of Exemption 4 to include 
information that would clearly be of a public interest, therefore limiting 
newsgathering and the free flow of information. Narrow categories of 
records, such as a secret formula or information directly affecting 
businesses’ competitiveness in the marketplace, should remain protected 
from disclosure. However, in situations like those arising in Food Marketing 
Institute, where the information at issue clearly details the workings of 
government agencies and is of public concern, disclosure is essential. 
Because the Supreme Court curtailed the free flow of such information with 
its decision, Congressional action is needed to ensure that Exemption 4 
does not limit newsgathering and government transparency. 
Significantly, Congress has already considered legislation that would 
achieve the resolution discussed above. S. 2220 would formally incorporate 
the substantial harm test, helping to clarify the harm requirement in a way 
that would help promote broader disclosure of information related to 
Exemption 4, providing an adequate resolution to the concerns raised by 
Food Marketing Institute. Congress has demonstrated that it recognizes and 
has the ability to act on key issues raised following the Supreme Court’s 
ruling. This formal change would ensure that, at least in cases arising around 
Exemption 4 of FOIA, newsgathering, transparency, and the free flow of 
information are promoted and protected. 
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